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Does increased credit supply affect financial and economic activity? In 
recent years, the negative effects of credit supply growth have been implicated 
in the severity of the financial crisis of the past decade, namely through the 
accumulation of mortgage debt in the United States (Mian and Sufi 2009). 
Historical data also show that credit supply booms are associated with longer, 
deeper, and more persistent recessions (Jordà et al. 2011). These studies offer a 
counterpoint to the existing scholarship on the positive relationship between 
finance and economic growth observed across countries and over time (e.g, 
Levine 2005). A related question is how market access can interact with credit 
supply to affect the economy. Investment in physical infrastructure that 
integrates markets significantly alters the economic landscape with both short 
and long run consequences. There is a large literature on transport 
improvements like railways and roads that generally demonstrate a positive 
economic impact on local and national economies (e.g., Atack et al 2008; 
Jaworski and Kitchens, forthcoming; Bogart 2014), although there are also 
redistributive effects in terms of industrial agglomeration and public health 
(Tang 2014, 2018). 
How these two forces of change interact and affect the structure of an 
economy, particularly in measures of growth and labor markets over the long 
run, remains an open question due to the challenges of identification and data 
availability, especially in a developing economy context.1 We address these 
problems by using a historical dataset in a quasi-natural experimental setting, 
specifically a large credit supply shock and the introduction of railroads in Japan 
that respectively underpinned the country's financial and transport revolutions. 
In 1876, the Japanese government compulsorily replaced the hereditary stipends 
of former samurai with interest bearing government bonds.2 The ex-samurai 
represented about five percent of the population and the replacement bonds 
were collectively valued at 210 million yen, which was equivalent to nearly half 
 
1 There exists a large economic development literature that investigates the microeconomic short-run effects of 
credit supply injections. For example, Banerjee and Duflo (2014) on firm investment or Burgess and Pande (2005) on 
poverty. The aim of our paper is on the long-run aggregate economic effects. In this sense, it is more related to the 
macro-finance literature in the tradition of the seminal paper of King and Levine (1993)    
2 Samurai were a hereditary class of warriors in pre-modern Japan that were the de facto rulers during the Edo period 
(1603 to 1867). Their monopolies on political and military power were dissolved following the Meiji restoration in 
1868; see the next section for more detail. 
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of the country's national income in 1876 and six times total government 
revenue, but also an annual loss to the ex-samurai of up to 75 percent of their 
original stipends (Flath 2014, p. 33; Yamamura 1967, p. 204).3 These bonds 
catalyzed the growth of banking throughout the country during a time of relative 
financial underdevelopment. Around the same time, the country received its 
first railways, with the cities of Tokyo and Yokohama connected in 1872, and 
the network progressively expanded across the country over the next four 
decades to create a national system that is still in use today. 
To assess the effects of these shocks on regional development, we use 
bond values at the time of the stipend commutation and early rail station 
construction to proxy for differences in credit availability and market access, 
respectively. Since the stipend conversion was universal, compulsory, and 
resisted by the ex-samurai themselves, this financial policy reform is plausibly 
exogenous to existing or anticipated local economic activity (McLaren 1979).4 
Similarly, railways were initially built for national defense and political 
centralization but constrained by geographic considerations and limited 
financing (Ericson 1996). Our identification comes from the regional variation 
in per capita samurai bond values and rail stations. The former corresponds to 
the distribution of resident ex-samurai that existed before the policy change, 
while the latter to the opening of treaty ports connecting to the largest cities at 
the time.5 We hypothesize that, given the high variation of per capita bond 
values between regions, this credit supply shock and concomitant increase in 
financial intermediation may influence subsequent differences in economic 
activity between those regions. Furthermore, since the economy was in the 
process of industrializing and imperfectly integrated during the late nineteenth 
 
3 There were earlier voluntary commutations of samurai stipends in 1873 and 1874, amounting to 36 million yen in 
cash and bonds and about one-third of eligible ex-samurai took up the conversion. The 1876 commutation was valued 
at 174 million yen, paid only in government bonds, and applied to all remaining samurai liabilities. Income loss was 
proportionately greater the higher the original stipend value, with ex-samurai receiving a quarter of their earlier income 
if their stipend was valued greater than 70,000 yen while the poorest ex-samurai received nearly all their original stipend 
value from the bond interest payments; see Table I. 
4 “The effect of [the 1876 stipend commutation law] was instantaneous and manifested itself in an epidemic of 
samurai riots and lawless demonstrations against the government” (McLaren 1979, p. 562). This culminated in the 
unsuccessful 1877 Seinan rebellion led by dissatisfied samurai. We test for differences in regional performance before 
the introduction of bonds and railways as a pre-level check of exogeneity. 
5 Formally, when we regress the log of bond value per capita in 1876 on observables in 1874 (per capita income, 
population, urbanization), none of the control variables is statistically significant. Furthermore, the pairwise correlation 
between regional per capita income in 1874 and regional per capita bond value in 1876 is statistically insignificant. 
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century, our analysis of local credit supply and uneven market access via 
railways provides evidence of both potential short run impact on local 
economies as well as persistent differences in the long run.6 
We test our hypothesis that variation in initial credit supply and rail 
access affects local economic activity by regressing per capita income growth 
on per capita samurai bond value, rail stations, and their interaction at the 
prefectural level between 1874 and 1940.7 Our dataset includes intervening 
benchmark years, which provide more systematic evidence of trends and 
persistence. To better identify the channels of transmission, we separately 
estimate the impact by major sector, include different bond coupon rates and 
banking capital measures, as well as examine possible correspondence in 
sectoral labor shares. We also control for path dependence and differences in 
initial conditions using lagged income, population (market size), per capita 
student enrollment share (human capital), and low gradient land population 
density (urbanization). 
Our results indicate that there are two main redistributive effects: 
between sectors and between regions. In the short run (1874-1890), we find that 
the interaction between per capita samurai bond value and rail access is 
positively associated with growth in the tertiary sector, which includes finance, 
retail, and other services.8 Over the same period, the primary sector experienced 
a large decline in growth among regions with high bond values and railway 
access. In marginal terms, for rail accessible regions a 1 percent increase in per 
capita samurai bond value corresponded with nearly a 12 percent increase in per 
capita income growth for the tertiary sector and a 27 percent decrease for the 
primary sector. These results are consistent with showing how both credit 
supply and market access have sector-specific effects and allow for a more 
rational reallocation of economic activity between sectors. 
 
6 See Banerjee and Iyer (2005) for a similar approach on regional differences affecting long run growth. 
7 Prefectures, which we use interchangeably with the word regions, are the main subnational administrative division 
in Japan, akin to states in the US and counties in the UK. There are 47 prefectures in Japan. 
8 The primary sector includes the agriculture, forestry, and fishery industries; the secondary sector includes mining, 
manufacturing, construction, and utilities; and the tertiary sector includes commercial services (e.g., retail, finance) and 
transport. For the latter sector, unfortunately finance is not separately disaggregated from other commercial services 
(Fukao et al 2015). 
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Lengthening the coverage into the early twentieth century reduces the 
magnitude of the effect of our interaction on both the primary and tertiary 
sectors, although growth persists through the decades leading up to World War 
Two. In particular, given rail access, a 1 percent increase in average per capita 
bond value is associated with a 9 percent decline in growth in the primary sector 
between 1874 and 1940. For the tertiary sector, growth would increase about 4 
percent. The extended time horizon underscores the significance of these shocks 
on the economy and support the interpretation of structural change. All 
specifications for our regression model include prefectural control variables 
such as population, school enrollment, urbanization, and a lagged term of per 
capita income as well as year dummies. 
To check our mechanism of how the bonds were used, we substitute per 
capita banking capital for bond value in our specifications. In the primary sector, 
the negative effect is more modest and less persistent when regressed on 
banking capital while the tertiary sector effect becomes insignificant. This 
suggests that while bank capital, which used a large share of samurai bonds as 
collateral, is associated with less primary production per our bond specification 
results, the bonds were mainly used to grow the financial industry within the 
tertiary sector and thus banking had little effect on other services.   
In terms of labor markets, we use sectoral labor share ratios instead of 
per capita income as dependent variables for the same specifications. Consistent 
with our income estimates by sector, primary sector labor shares decline relative 
to tertiary and secondary employment in the short run with some persistence to 
the end of our period. Our results are also robust to disaggregation of bond type 
as well as the exclusion of outliers such as Tokyo or areas adjacent to major 
cities.  
Together, these findings indicate that the real economy, measured in 
output and labor, was significantly impacted by the samurai bond issue and 
introduction of railways but only when considered by industry and region. For 
the average prefecture, the overall economic impact on growth was neutral in 
the short and long run, but variation along different margins (e.g., bond type, 
concentration of bond value) suggests significant local differences that may owe 




While there is a well-established link between financial sector 
development and economic growth across countries and overtime (King and 
Levine 1993; Rajan and Zingales 1998), less clear is the role of credit supply on 
regions within a country over the long run.9 Historically, periods of economic 
growth coincided with increased credit intensity, but the overhang of excess 
credit in turn magnified the severity of crises and delayed recovery through 
debt-deflation pressure on prices and swings in expectations (Jordà et al 2011; 
Schularick and Taylor 2012). Most of the literature has focused on 
macroeconomic financial aggregates or use modern data, leaving the within-
country impact and its long run persistence unaddressed. Furthermore, 
differences in market access such as transport infrastructure are usually 
unaccounted for. 
This paper exploits within-country variation in credit supply via a 
historic public bond issuance. This empirical strategy is similar to Mian and 
Sufi (2009) which compares ZIP codes in the U.S. to uncover the origins of the 
mortgage debt boom in the late 2000s. Similarly, Guiso et al. (2004) exploit 
regulation variations within Italy to analyze the effect of local financial 
development within an integrated financial system. Mian et al (2017) examine 
the impact of credit supply shocks in the United States for the modern period 
starting in the 1980s. In contrast to these papers, we analyze differences in credit 
supply across regions in a financially and physically fragmented economy and 
for a longer period of time. This allows us to control for aggregate country 
shocks and to investigate the effect of credit supply growth and its persistence. 
We can also include variation in market access via rail station construction to 
show the interplay between credit supply and demand. 
Japan in the late nineteenth century provides a useful setting to examine 
the roles of credit provision and usage on local economic outcomes. Starting in 
 
9The finance-led growth literature uses a variety of measures of financial development like credit availability, assets 
and liabilities, capital formation, and institutions to assess changes in income and industrial growth. The underlying 
rationale emphasizes the roles of transaction costs, capital allocation, and risk management in facilitating growth. 
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the Meiji Period (1868-1912), the government implemented numerous reforms 
and, along with private sector entrepreneurs, invested in infrastructure and 
industrial enterprises to modernize the economy. By the turn of the century, 
Japanese manufacturing had reached the same share of output as the United 
States and continued to increase in value-added and capital intensity (Perkins 
and Tang 2017). 10 The tertiary sector also experienced dramatic growth as 
shown with the rise of general merchandising, shop-keeping, financial 
intermediation, and transport services (land and water).11 
While Japan’s financial sector development, measured both intensively 
(e.g., financial assets, equities) and extensively (e.g., banks, informal 
intermediaries), is associated with its overall industrialization (Rousseau 1999; 
Tang 2013), a plausible causal trigger to its transition was an earlier large 
exogenous shock to its credit supply. This shock was the 1876 conversion of 
hereditary samurai stipends (aka, chitsuroku) into government bonds (aka, 
kinroku) worth 173.9 million yen, motivated by the drain on public finances 
from samurai payments. 12  In the years leading up to the conversion, these 
payments accounted for one quarter to one third of all government expenditures 
in the 1870s (Beasley 1972).13 The bond issuance would improve the central 
government's fiscal position while simultaneously provide a major source of 
investment capital for agricultural and industrial expansion (Harootunian 1960; 
McLaren 1979). The conversion was also sizeable relative to the existing supply 
of government bonds: before the issue of the 1876 kinroku bonds, public bonds 
totalled 51.5 million yen at that time. 14  Table I provides the stipend 
 
10 The content of Japanese manufacturing at the time, however, was still relatively labor intensive and low value, 
as demonstrated by its export composition consisting mainly of textiles (Meissner and Tang, forthcoming). 
11 Makimura (2017) describes the activities of raw silk purveyors and the large amounts of merchandise they 
handled and sold for export in the Yokohama region during this period. This preceded Japan's textile manufacturing 
expansion from the turn of the century, when cotton textiles and woven fabrics were produced domestically and 
exported (Meissner and Tang, forthcoming). 
12 This conversion was preceded by a number of events that also affected the economic and social status of samurai. 
First, the 1868 Charter Oath effectively ended the professional monopolies of samurai warriors on military and 
government power (Bary 1964). This was followed by the creation of a conscript army in 1873 and the prohibition of 
sword carrying in 1876. 
13 A similar share covered government administration costs and the remainder was for military expenses.  
14 This figure includes the 16.6 million yen in public bonds for voluntary stipend conversion between 1874 and 
1876.  
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commutation scales into interest bearing bonds, which had a maturity of thirty 
years and a minimum holding period of five years.15 
[Table I] 
There were some immediate consequences following the stipend 
conversion. First, interest payments by the government fell from 34.6 million 
yen before the 1868 Meiji restoration to 12.8 million yen after the 1876 stipend 
conversion. Second, the Japanese banking system expanded rapidly since under 
the revised 1876 National Banking Act chartered national banks were allowed 
to accept these commutation bonds as investment capital and to issue 
convertible notes based on reserves; in effect, the bond issue catalyzed the 
growth of national banks across prefectures (Yamamura 1967).16 Modeled after 
the extant American national banking system, these banks increased from 6 in 
1876 to 153 over the next three years and were spread throughout the country, 
with ex-samurai contributing three times more capital in these banks compared 
to all other classes combined (ibid, p. 205).17 The dominant position of samurai 
in national bank ownership remained in place through the 1880s, which 
coincided with the start of modern economic growth and Japan's subsequent 
transition to an industrialized economy (Rousseau 1999; Tang 2013).18  
The public finance and banking narratives, however, are incomplete in 
that the national budget remained precarious given military expenditures, high 
inflation and later deflation, and the small share of samurai bonds (27 percent 
 
15 Interest payments were made in May for each year of the commutation duration, except for the first year 1877, 
which was made in November. Adjustments were made for stipend conversions near threshold limits to ensure lower 
income conversion payments did not exceed those at the next higher threshold. Interest would be paid between five and 
fourteen years, and redemption of all kinroku bonds was completed by 1906. See McLaren (1979, pp 562-566), Tomita 
(2005, pp. 14-16), and Table I for details. 
16 The 1876 National Bank and Kinroku Public Bond Instrument Issue Ordinances allowed national banks to be 
established with government bonds paying a (lower) four percent interest rate and the (higher) ratio of paid-in capital 
of government bonds to 80 percent (Tomita 2005). All bonds would be redeemed up to thirty years after issuance. To 
facilitate securitization and capital mobilization, stock exchanges were set up in Osaka and Tokyo in 1878.  
17 Shizume and Tsurumi (2016). The 1879 breakdown of capital contribution to national banks was 76.0 percent 
samurai (including the kazoku nobility), 14.6 merchants, 3.5 farmers, and 5.7 others. On average, national banks had 
capital nearly three times larger than private banks; see ibid., table 1 for a breakdown in 1881. For a list of major 
financial reforms in the late nineteenth century, see Tang (2013), table 1. 
18 The overall macroeconomic effect of the stipend conversion is disputed, however, with some studies alleging 
samurai incompetence in investment and management as well as an exaggerated influence of the national banks 
(Harootunian 1960; Yamamura 1974). 
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by value) invested in national banks (Tomita 2005).19 The high inflation period 
immediately following the stipend commutation may have also created 
uncertainty around the government’s commitment to fulfill its bond obligations, 
motivating samurai to invest their bonds in enterprises, sell them at a discount, 
or to redeem them as soon as possible. Exacerbating these initial conditions was 
the lack of capital market integration in Japan, which persisted until the 1890s 
following the establishment of a central bank and its branch network that 
reduced interest rate spreads (Mitchener and Ohnuki 2007). Moreover, these 
bonds were not limited to bank capitalization: between 1876 and 1889, 
businesses owned by samurai also grew extensively and varied from small 
companies to joint-stock corporations (Harootunian 1960). The pairwise 
correlation of per capita bonds in 1876 with per capita banking capital in 1884 
is 0.75 and with per capita bank counts is 0.30.20 By focusing solely on the role 
of banking, the contribution of the bond issue on tertiary sector growth that 
includes financial services would be obscured. 
[Figures I and II] 
The premise of our identification strategy is that since the ex-samurai 
and their bond payments were unequally distributed across prefectures, their 
contribution to local economic activity via additional credit may account for the 
short and long run regional differences measured more broadly in industrial 
activity, income growth, and labor productivity (Moriguchi and Saez 2008; 
Fukao et al 2015). In Figures I and II, we map the geographic distribution of 
bond value per capita and pre- and post-bond issue income per capita by 
prefecture. As shown, there is wide variation between regions, with significant 
differences in subsequent performance not accounted for simply by initial 
samurai placement and associated bond values. For example, while Tokyo, 
Kagoshima, and Ishikawa prefectures received the largest amount of bonds, the 
latter two prefectures did not experience significant post-bond issue growth. In 
 
19 Yamamura (1967) finds the samurai contribution to modern Japanese banking to have been modest, and that 
commoners played a more important role when private and quasi-banks are included. 
20 At less than one percent statistical significance. The correlations increase when limited to only national banking 
measures: 0.80 for per capita national banking capital and 0.55 for per capital national bank counts by prefecture. 
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contrast, Osaka prefecture received few bonds but was like Tokyo a major 
metropolitan area and remained an industrial center throughout the Meiji and 
post-Meiji decades.21 Furthermore, demand for this credit may also have been 
uneven given available opportunities for investment, with access to the growing 
national market and international trade via improvements in transport affecting 
how the supplied credit was used.  
Corroborating our narrative of differential performance between 
prefectures, there was a significant rise in inequality in the period preceding 
World War Two due to shifts away from primary production, and this did not 
decrease until after the war (Fukao and Paul 2017). Major metropolitan areas 
like Tokyo and Osaka experienced rapid industrialization and more populated 
areas grew at the expense of smaller and more isolated ones following the 
expansion of the national railway system (Fukao et al 2017; Tang 2014). In the 
remaining sections, we analyze the extent by which prefectural differences in 
credit supply and market access may have affected economic activity and 
whether these persisted over time. 
 
II. Research Design 
A. Data 
To investigate the relationship between the local credit supply shock, 
market access, and subsequent development, we use historic data that provide 
prefectural measures of output, employment, bond values, rail station 
construction, and demographic characteristics. Collectively, these data span the 
period between 1874 and 1940 and are disaggregated by the 47 prefectures that 
comprise Japan, although many series are available for only a subset of 
prefectures. Output and labor force data by prefecture were collected for a 
number of benchmark years in the pre-war period: 1874, 1890, 1909, 1925, 
 
21 The early Meiji Period (1868-1912) distribution of samurai was established during the early Tokugawa Period 
(1603-1868) following the Battle of Sekigahara, when the Tokugawa shoguns distributed feudal domains (i.e., hans) 
based on loyalty of the local rulers and enforced periodic residence in Edo (later renamed Tokyo) of these rulers through 
the policy of sankin kotai (Jansen 2000). The domains, residential requirements, and samurai privileges were abolished 
by imperial proclamation under the Meiji emperor in 1869. 
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1935 and 1940 (Fukao et al 2015). These data are also separable by prefecture 
into the three major sectors of primary, secondary, and tertiary categories for 
the entire period. The advantages to using these output data include the ability 
to measure possible persistence over time even as the national economy became 
increasingly integrated both in financial capital and goods as well as being 
exposed to international trade. Data on bonds issued to samurai by prefecture in 
1876 were collected by the Japanese Ministry of Finance (1904). Railway data 
are from a handbook of rail station construction, which provide both dates and 
locations of all stations built starting in the 1870s (Chuo Shoin 1995; Tang 
2014). 
Average per capita bond values in nominal yen are shown in the last 
column in Table II. Extreme values include Tokyo (40.42 yen per capita) and 
Yamanashi (0.14 yen per capita), which can be attributed in part to the high 
share of wealthy samurai living in the former (who received 5 percent coupon 
bonds) and the lack of in the latter. Moreover, there are nine prefectures that did 
not exist at the time of the 1876 commutation, so no bond values for these are 
available, bringing the sample in the analysis down to 38 prefectures.22 Table 
III shows the breakdown of chartered national banks, which received much of 
their paid-in capital from these samurai bonds. These bank counts and samurai 
ownership shares underscore the relative immobility of financial capital 
between regions at the beginning this period, despite efforts by the government 
to create a national system during this period.23 The lack of integration in the 
short run demonstrated by the dispersion of capital may thus allow for localized 
economic impacts from the bond issuance, which were not fully redeemed until 
the first decade of the 1900s.24 
 
22 The nine prefectures missing bond data are Fukui, Kagawa, Miyazaki, Nara, Okinawa, Saga, Tokyshima, Tottori, 
and Toyama. 
23 Shizume and Tsurumi (2016) describe the evolution of the national banking system starting with the 1876 
National Bank Act up to the creation of the central bank, the Bank of Japan, in 1882. Similar efforts to centralize 
banking activity took place in the United States, on which the Japanese model was based (Komai and Richardson 2011). 
24 Redemption of 7 percent coupon bonds, which represented 62 percent of the total bond issue, was completed in 
September 1891; 6 percent interest bearing bonds (14 percent) were all redeemed in April 1893; and 5 percent interest 
bearing bonds (18 percent) in April 1906; see Tomita (2015). Special bonds bearing 10 percent interest (5 percent total 
bond value) were all redeemed by June 1886. 
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[Tables II and III] 
Prefectural output measures in per capita terms and by sector are shown 
in the top and third panels of Table IV, covering the years between 1874 and 
1940. Throughout this period, Japan steadily increased its per capita output in 
real terms, with the shares of value from secondary and tertiary sectors growing 
at the expense of primary production. The period between 1874 and 1909 shows 
a doubling of secondary sector value, which reached nearly one third of national 
output by 1940 largely due to a shift away from primary production. This is true 
for all prefectures in the country and for those with available bond data. The 
second and bottom panels show a similar breakdown for employment, which 
also shifted away from primary production into the secondary and tertiary 
sectors, doubling their proportions of the labor force by the end of the period. 
 [Table IV] 
B . Theoretical Motivation 
 How should the bond conversion of former samurai stipends affect the 
economic activity? Numerous anecdotes of former samurai (e.g., Yasuda 
Zenjiro of Yasuda Mutual Life Insurance, Iwasaki Yataro of Mitsubishi, and 
Fujioka Ichisuke of Tokyo Electric Light) illustrate their success in establishing 
new firms and investing in banks (Yamamura 1974, Tokyo Dento 1936). While 
there were nascent equity exchanges in Tokyo and Osaka, most firm capital 
formation was through network finance without necessarily using banks as 
intermediaries. At the same time, banking played a role in mobilizing financial 
capital and using the samurai bonds as collateral as intended with the National 
Banking Act of 1876 (Tomita 2015). In this section, we briefly summarize the 
theoretical channels through which financial development may affect the 
economy and how we can empirically test its effect. 
 Financial development loosely describes different functions that 
financial systems provide in an economy. Levine (2005) emphasizes five 
functions: (i) produce information and improve capital allocation, (ii) monitor 
investment after providing finance, (iii) increase diversification and reduce 
uncertainty, (iv) mobilize and pool savings, and (v) facilitate the exchange of 
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goods and services. Samurai bonds may have helped to improve Japanese 
financial institutions in more than one of the above categories, for example, by 
creating new assets in the economy to generate growth (Acemoglu and Zillibotti 
1997). Moreover, the use of samurai bonds to capitalize chartered national 
banks could be conducive to increasing the number of firms (Holmstrom and 
Tirole 1997). Finally, by helping to mobilize resources, samurai bonds may 
have helped to fund large projects that could not have been funded by individual 
investors (Bagehot 1873), although in the case of the two leading industries, 
cotton spinning and railways, the start-up investment requirements were funded 
through equity markets.. 
 While we are unable to precisely disentangle the specific channels 
through which the samurai bond issuance affected Japanese development, we 
can more generally empirically assess the effect of financial development 
proxied by samurai bonds per capita on subsequent economic activity by 
prefecture and sector. Similar to Mian et al (2007), we analyze how the 
economic growth of different regions within a country are affected by their 
initial level of financial development. The empirical framework follows the 
tradition of cross-country growth regressions to estimate the effect of financial 
development on economic growth as employed by King and Levine (1993).25 
Our contributions are to use the provision of a financial instrument instead of 
changes in regulation; an identification strategy with a quasi-experimental 
setting for a plausible causal interpretation; and a long run data series that allows 
for analysis of both short run effects and potential persistence.26  
 Furthermore, given that we have sectoral disaggregation, we can study 
the differential effect of financial development across sectors and time. 
Following Rajan and Zingales (1998), who show that the effect of financial 
development should depend on the characteristics of the industries, we perform 
 
25 Although there exists a large literature which analyzes episodes of financial liberalization (e.g., Kaminski and 
Schmukler, 2008) we view the samurai bond event as an increase in credit supply, which affected the level of financial 
development of the country, more than a financial liberalization. There exist more papers which run similar cross-
country financial development-economic growth regressions. For example, Loayza et al. (2006), which emphasize that 
financial intermediation may have a negative short-run effect but a positive in the long run. Similarly, Arcand et al. 
(2015) argue that too much financial development may have a negative effect on growth.  
26 There have been several papers which have related historical events with persistent long-run effects. For example, 
the seminal paper of Acemoglu et al (2001) emphasize that the type of institutions that Europeans adopted in the 
different colonies had long and persistent effects. 
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a similar exercise but within a country and at a higher level of aggregation. 
Consistent with their predictions, we should find that the effect of samurai 
bonds on economic activity is exacerbated in financially dependent sectors like 
heavy industry and finance and muted in less dependent sectors like agriculture. 
With domestic and international market integration, these effects should also 
attenuate over time. 
 One additional contribution not found in the financial development 
literature is the effect of market access, for which we use connection to the 
nascent national rail network as our proxy. The positive effect of railways on 
economic development is well-established, and we extend this scholarship by 
testing the hypothesis that financial development has a more positive effect on 
local development if it occurs simultaneously with local latent demand, 
particularly investment opportunities that improve access to technology or 
markets (Summerhill 2005; Atack et al 2008; Herranz-Loncan 2011; Donaldson 
2018). This conditional effect of the availability of profitable investment 
opportunities has anecdotal support in the historical record, with many samurai 
and entrepreneurs failing in their ventures due to the immaturity of the economy 
and non-viable ventures (Harootunian 1960, p. 443). At the same time, there 
may be redistributional effects as well since rail access encouraged industrial 
agglomeration and shifts toward manufacturing, both of which required higher 
levels of credit supply (Tang 2014). In the context of pre-war Japan, we argue 
that per capita railway stations serve as a reasonable proxy for market access, 
local credit demand, and potential growth. Since the introduction and placement 
of the railways during the 1870s and 1880s was exogenous to the government's 
bond issue, the two effects of credit availability and railway access can be 
compared against regions that received just one or the other and highlight their 
collective importance to growth.27 
 
 
27 Government motivations for constructing a national railway network at the time were initially for national 
security (e.g., defense against invasion, troop mobilization), political centralization, and connection of regional 
population centers (Tang 2014). The constraints of geography and terrain difficulty coupled with insufficient public 
financing limited construction to lowest cost placement and deviations in timing of line placement, which provide 
exogenous variation for our analysis (Yamazaki 2017). As noted earlier, we perform a pre-1876 bond issue check for 
differential performance among regions that would receive both higher levels of bond values and early rail access and 
do not find statistically significant differences in 1874 among prefectures. 
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C. Empirical Strategy 
Per our previous discussion, we consider the following growth 
regression to assess the effect of bond value per capita and rail access on 
economic activity of Japan:  
 
(1)  ∆𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1 ∗ 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1) + 𝛽𝛽2 ∗ 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑙𝑙𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖0 + 𝛽𝛽3 ∗
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐵𝐵𝑙𝑙𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖1 + 𝛽𝛽4 ∗ 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑙𝑙𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖0 ∗ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐵𝐵𝑙𝑙𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖1 + 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, 
 
where ∆ 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖/𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1) , 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  is gross prefecture 
product per capita in prefecture i and year t, 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑙𝑙𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖0 is the bond value per capita 
in 1876, and 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐵𝐵𝑙𝑙𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖1  is the number of railway stations per capita in 
prefecture i in year 1885. Both per capita bond value in 1876 and prefectural 
output from 1874 to 1940 are measured in constant 1934-36 yen (Fukao et al. 
2015). We use railways in 1885 in our baseline specification because that year 
coincides with both the end of the Matsukata deflationary period, which 
promoted private investment, and the start of the railway boom, but we also 
consider for robustness the number of stations per capita in 1880, which 
provides similar results. As discussed in Tang (2014), initial market conditions 
in Japanese regions created path dependency and industrial agglomeration, so 
we anticipate a larger growth effect in areas that joined the national railway 
network and market earlier in the period. To control for possible output 
convergence over time between prefectures we include a lag term for the 
previous period's per capita output. Our preferred specification also includes 
prefectural-level control variables of population (i.e., market size), per capita 
student enrollment share in 1885 (i.e., initial human capital), and low gradient 
land population density (i.e., urbanization) in the current year.  
The main variable of interest, 𝛽𝛽4,  is the interaction between 1876 per 
capita bond values (aka, credit supply) and 1885 per capita railway stations (aka, 
credit demand). 𝛽𝛽4 > 0 implies that the effect of credit supply on prefectural 
economic development is exacerbated if the prefecture has railway access. We 
then compute the total effect of credit supply for the average prefecture with the 
average number of railway stations on ouptut growth all in per capita and 
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constant yen terms. Finally, we run this regression for different time periods, 
from the short run (1874 to 1890) through the long run (1874 to 1940) and 
intervening years.28 Since our base year of 1874 precedes the bond issue, our 
model can identify the change in growth due to that shock. We expect that the 
effect of the credit supply shock on GPP growth per capita attenuates over time, 
varies by sector, and differs by early rail access.   
 
We are also interested in the possible effect of credit supply and market 
access on the structural transformation of Japan. In order to perform this 
complementary exercise, we run the following regression,  
(2)  
∆𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐵𝐵12𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1 ∗ 𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐵𝐵12𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝛽𝛽2 ∗ 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑙𝑙𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖0 + 𝛽𝛽3 ∗
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐵𝐵𝑙𝑙𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖1 + 𝛽𝛽4 ∗ 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑙𝑙𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖0 ∗ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐵𝐵𝑙𝑙𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖1 + 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, 
 
where ∆𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐵𝐵12𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  is the change in the ratio of the labor force for one 
sector over another for all three sectoral combinations. Included covariates are 
the same as in the previous model, with lag term for labor force ratio capturing 
earlier reallocation. As with our output model, we interpret a positive average 
total effect from per capita bond value as facilitating the transition between the 
numerator sector relative to that in the denominator and show results for the 
three possible combinations. These regressions are run for each subperiod up 
through the entire period between 1874 and 1940. Per earlier scholarship (Fukao 
et al. 2015; Fukao and Paul 2017; Tang 2014), we expect high values of bonds 
per capita and rail access to facilitate movement away from the primary sector 
into the other two sectors. 
 
 
28 The use of benchmark years ranging between five and nineteen years means that our analysis does not specifically 
control for subperiods of inflation and deflation. For example, the first period between 1874 and 1890 covers both the 
inflationary years immediately following the bond issue (1877-1881) and the subsequent deflationary period (aka, the 
Matsukata deflation between 1881 and 1885). Given that we adjust all values for bonds and output to constant yen 
terms, include year dummies, and are agnostic as to the individuals holding the bonds at any given point in time, we do 
not consider periods of inflation or deflation problematic in the interpretation of our results. 
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III. Results 
A. Output Growth  
To generalize the economic effects to output as a whole as well as to 
examine how credit supply was used over time, we examine prefectural per 
capita output growth over the short and long run and include the adoption of 
railways. Table V provides results for the first period 1874 to 1890, starting 
with individual control variables for per capita bond value and rail stations, and 
then adding their interaction term and additional prefectural controls. In other 
words, these specifications decompose the effect from the credit supply shock 
(i.e., bonds per capita in 1876) from the market access shock (i.e., per capita rail 
stations in 1885) and their interaction. In the top panel, there is no statistically 
significant relationship between overall output growth and the included 
variables across most of the specifications as the F-statistic is not significant. 
Only with the full complement of control variables in the last column is there a 
meaningful relationship, with per capita bond value negative and significant at 
the 10 percent level. However, taking account of the inclusion of per capita rail 
stations and their interaction (i.e., the average total effect), there is no overall 
joint significance.29 
[Table V] 
The remaining panels perform the same decomposition exercise for the 
three sectors of the economy. For the primary sector, per capita bond value by 
itself does not have any significant impact on primary sector output growth 
(column A). However, when interacted with per capita railways stations 
(columns C and D), the coefficient is negative, indicating that conditional on 
early rail access higher per capita bond value reduces primary sector output 
growth. Moreover, this effect is observed even taking into account the 
component terms of the interaction, with a negative and significant effect up to 
the year 1925 as shown in the average total effect. 
 
29 This is calculated from the average natural log of per capita bond value (all sectors) of -0.292 and the average 
per capita (thousand) station count of 0.0025 across prefectures.  
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When we repeat this exercise for the secondary sector, we do not find 
significant effects from either bond value or rail stations per capita. While 
column C does show a slight positive net growth effect, this becomes 
insignificant once urbanization and initial human capital are included as 
covariates (column D). This suggests that conditional on existing levels of 
development, the credit shock and market access variables do not contribute to 
short term growth. These additional covariates may in turn reflect selective 
labor mobility (e.g., skill, age) between prefectures, activist regional policies, 
the activities of local merchants and farmers, or prefecture-specific 
characteristics not captured by the credit shock. Since the bond value per capita 
variable is cross-sectional and at the prefecture level, we are unable to include 
a separate prefecture dummy and thus cannot account for these other factors.30 
The bottom panel reports the coefficients for the regression on tertiary 
sector output growth. Note that we obtain the opposite results compared to those 
for primary production, which may account for the lack of an average total 
output growth effect in the top panel. For each of these two sectors, the signs 
on the coefficients for rail access and its interaction with bonds are the same 
(negative-negative for primary, positive-positive for tertiary), suggesting a 
complementarity of credit demand and supply. These results also underscore 
the redistributive effects of the credit supply shock: given early access to 
railways, areas with higher bond value per capita experienced higher (lower) 
growth in tertiary (primary) output. An average total effect is also observed for 
all periods up to 1925, but positively signed for tertiary production. 
The full set of period regressions is shown in Table VI, starting with 
1874 to 1890 and expanding to each subsequent year of available data (up to 
1940).31 There are four results to highlight: 
 
30 The first population census for Japan took place in 1920, which means uniform and consistent estimates of 
internal migration between prefectures are unavailable before then (Matsuda 1981). A related issue is that the analysis 
uses the unit of the prefecture, not sub-prefectural units that existed in the pre-Meiji Period (i.e., han domains). Since 
estimates of prefectural income and demographics exist starting from 1874 onward (Fukao et al 2015) and not for 
domains, it is infeasible to study the sub-prefectural effects for the period in our analysis, which may provide more 
variation and precise estimates of the bond and rail effects. At the same time, measuring persistence after the 1880s at 
the domain level would also be infeasible since government statistics were no longer collected at that administrative 
level. 
31Note that the first column in this table is the same as column D in Table V. 
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1) There is no significant effect from the interaction of the credit supply shock 
and market access on aggregate output growth in any period.  
2) There is a significant effect on the redistribution of output between 
prefectures and sectors. The average total effect is negative and significant 
in the first three periods up to the year 1925 for the primary sector while the 
opposite sign is observed for the same duration in the tertiary sector. 
Furthermore, for the subset of prefectures that gained early rail access, the 
coefficients on the interaction between bond value and rail stations are 
similar to the average total effects for the primary and tertiary sectors, 
respectively, but in all periods. 
3) The redistributive effects of both credit supply and market access persist 
through most of our periods of analysis and gradually attenuate over time. 
This can be seen in both the magnitudes of the coefficients on the interaction 
of bond value and rail stations as well as in the average total effect. For the 
latter, the cumulative effect of bonds and railways is associated with a 
decline in the primary sector ranging from -0.083 (column 1, 1874-1890) to 
-0.018 (column 5, 1874-1940). For the tertiary sector, the positive growth 
effect starts with 0.041 (1874-1890) and persists for another three dècades 
to 0.020 (1874-1925).  
4) Related to the previous point, the effect from the credit supply shock grows 
in importance over time relative to the market access effect for both the 
primary and tertiary sectors, and persists in significance longer in the latter. 
This can be observed in the declining absolute magnitude of the coefficient 
on rail stations for both sectors. Our interpretation is that this indicates 
railways by themselves were not solely responsible for the redistribution of 
activity across regions in Japan and worked with the credit supply shock to 
generate the long run impact. 
 [Table VI] 
B. Robustness Checks  
Before looking at the impact on labor shares, we first examine a more 
direct channel of finance, banking capital, on real output growth. In our 
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theoretical discussion, we emphasized the development of financial institutions 
as the most likely mechanism through which bonds could affect economic 
activity. According to this narrative, we should find similar results when using 
total banking capital per capita instead of bond value per capita in our 
regressions. That said, there are two limitations to this approach. First, total 
banking capital (85.2 million yen) represented less than half of all bond value 
(173.8 million yen), and samurai ownership of this banking capital was less than 
one sixth (30.7 million yen). Second, banking capital is already included in the 
tertiary sector and not further separable in the data from other subsectors. 
Therefore, we would expect that total banking capital had a negative effect on 
primary sector growth and a muted or insignificant effect on tertiary sector 
growth, which is indeed what we find.  
[Table VII] 
Table VII reports the coefficients on the same regressions as in Table 
VI but with total banking capital per capita in 1884 instead of bond value per 
capita in 1876. One parallel between the two measures of financial capital is 
that banking capital per capita also did not have any effect on overall output 
growth across periods. Moreover, the quantitative effect of total bank capital on 
primary sector output growth is similar both in the marginal effect from the 
interaction term and in the average total effect. The main difference with the 
previous table is that since banking capital is already included in the tertiary 
sector, we fail to observe a positive effect on the tertiary sector growth. Our 
interpretation is that while the bonds were important for establishing many 
national banks, other banks and banking capital were more equitably distributed 
regardless of samurai presence. Nevertheless, these results are consistent with 
the view that financial development, including the extensive growth of 
intermediaries and direct investment into enterprises with an alienable financial 
instrument (Tang 2016), facilitated sector reallocation and that the catalyst was 
the samurai stipend commutation into bonds. 
As discussed earlier, there exist opposing views on the role of samurai 
(e.g., entrepreneurs, political leaders) on the industrialization process of Japan. 
Even though resolving this debate is outside the scope of this paper, we can 
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contribute by analyzing the effect of banking capital owned by samurai. To do 
so, we use the share of national bank capital ownership by samurai to construct 
a samurai bank capital measure and use that instead of bond value per capita. 
The aforementioned pairwise correlation between per capita bond value and per 
capita national bank capital by prefecture is 0.80 and is significant to the one 
percent level.32 Using the samurai ownership share of national banks allows us 
to investigate whether prefectures dominated by banks owned by samurai 
exhibited different patterns from the other prefectures in real output growth.33 
[Table VIII] 
Table VIII reports the coefficients from this exercise, and the results 
from this table along with our bond per capita analysis are consistent with both 
sides of the samurai contribution debate. On the one hand, we can observe that 
prefectures with higher samurai bank capital did not experience higher overall 
growth in any of the subperiods, which supports the revisionist view that the 
activities of samurai-dominated banks were not disproportionate to the rest of 
the financial sector (Yamamura 1967). Moreover, we do not find any significant 
effect on the primary or tertiary sectors, suggesting that samurai ownership of 
these banks was not associated with sectoral reallocation, which again is 
consistent with the view that at least some of these banks were used as political 
instruments instead of profitmaking ventures, which we discuss further below. 
On the other hand, we do find that output in the secondary sector grew 
faster in prefectures with higher samurai bank capital, but only in the pre-WWI 
period. This may be explained by the timing: financial intermediaries facilitated 
the establishment of modern industries, and the national banks were the 
progenitors of the Japanese financial system (Tang 2013). These banks, 
however, needed the financial capital that was only available once the bonds 
were issued to the ex-samurai, which explains the difference in secondary 
versus tertiary sector growth in Tables VI and VIII.  
 
32 See footnote 19. 
33 Jha, Mitchener, and Takashima (2015) employ a similar approach in assessing the contributions of samurai on 
the political economy of Meiji Japan. 
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As in our previous results, the positive effect of samurai bank capital 
hinges on early access to the national rail network, our measure of market 
access, and this effect was persistent up to 1909, similar to the average total 
effect. These findings suggest that industrial activity increased in prefectures 
where ex-samurai managed to concentrate more resources in national banks and 
also had rail transport, but not in other sectors nor when total banking capital or 
the full value of bonds are considered. Further support of the relative importance 
of market access over samurai bank ownership in manufacturing, the coefficient 
on the latter variable itself is negative in the first two periods (and weakly 
significantly so between 1874 and 1909). Better disentanglement of samurai 
bank ownership and rail access, however, is not possible since the 1876 bond 
conversion and expansion of the rail network overlap within the first two 
benchmark years of the output data. 
Another related concern with our results is that the distribution of 
wealthy versus poor samurai among prefectures is uneven, with Tokyo as an 
extreme example (cf. Table II). This is due to the five percent coupon bonds, of 
which former samurai living in Tokyo received 96 percent of the national total. 
Removing these bonds from the total bond value mitigates this bias (i.e., 
Tokyo's bond value share falls to seven percent of the total value of bonds) and 
clarifies whether the redistributive effect generalizes across our sample of 
prefectures or if wealth concentration among a small group of affluent samurai 
is driving our results.   
[Table IX] 
Table IX reports the coefficients of running our baseline specifications 
with high coupon bond value per capita (i.e., excluding five percent bonds) 
instead of total bond value per capita. The coefficients are similar both 
qualitatively and quantitatively to our baseline specification in Table VI. We 
observe that as before the credit supply shock had a redistributive effect both 
between prefectures and sectors. That is, areas with more bond value per capita 
and early access to railways experienced faster growth in tertiary output and 
slower growth in primary output, and thus the bonds of non-wealthy samurai 
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across all regions, including Tokyo, exhibited the same patterns by sector and 
over time.34 
[Table X] 
In contrast, the estimates from Table X that use only the low coupon 
bond value per capita (i.e., five percent bonds) show a remarkably different 
pattern. In the top panel that combines all sectors, there is a negative growth 
effect in the first period (1874 to 1890), which is the only statistically significant 
result for average total growth in any of our specifications or periods of analysis. 
Bond value per capita itself is positive, but the impact from early rail access is 
negative; the latter relationship may owe to agglomeration effects in prefectures 
that gain rail access but lose industrial activity (Tang 2014). As the time frame 
lengthens, the average total effect becomes positive but weakens to statistical 
insignificance. We interpret this result as indicative of concentrated bond wealth 
not being growth enhancing per se, since the largest share of these low coupon 
bonds were held in Tokyo and channeled into politicized banks (e.g., the 
Fifteenth National Bank). The major leading industries in the pre-war period, 
on the other hand, were in railways and textiles and neither relied on bank 
finance as much as other sectors.  
The sectoral breakdowns also differ, with the results in the secondary 
sector showing similar patterns to those in the top panel. In particular, the 
coefficient on bond value per capita itself is positive and weakly significant, but 
the interaction with rail stations is negative. This suggests a lack of industrial 
development in the short run in areas with both, i.e., Tokyo. This result may 
appear inconsistent with the earlier estimates showing samurai bank ownership 
being conducive to early growth in the secondary sector (Table VIII), but 
samurai bank ownership was much more widely dispersed compared to 
prefectures receiving five percent bonds and banks were likely to invest in non-
financial activities, while the samurai bonds were used to establish the banks 
themselves. Another possible explanation is that even if Tokyo had the highest 
 
34 Regressions using samurai population share by prefecture (not shown) give qualitatively similar results with 
respect to redistribution between sectors and regions. Samurai population includes all family members and is divided 
by the resident population of the prefecture at the time. 
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amount of low coupon bonds, it was not the center of commercial and merchant 
activity in the early Meiji period. This is illustrated by Osaka, which received 
much less in total bond value (and no five percent bonds) but was the center of 
the nascent cotton spinning industry that would soon spearhead Japan's 
industrial development and exports.  
For the other sectors, the primary sector experiences large declines in 
growth in areas with larger bond value and rail stations per capita, but this is 
observed only with longer time windows. The tertiary sector, unlike in earlier 
tables, does not generally show growth from both bond value and rail access 
except in the second window (1874 to 1909). Since many of the wealthiest ex-
samurai (i.e., daimyo) invested their bonds in the Fifteenth National Bank based 
in Tokyo and this bank was used by the government for political purposes 
(Shizume and Tsurumi 2016, Yamamura 1967), it is possible that the lack of 
growth may be attributed to non-profitable lending or investments in less risky 
ventures similar to the behavior of larger Japanese firms like the zaibatsu 
conglomerates (Tang 2011).  
 [Table XI] 
Since Tokyo appears as an outlier in the value of bonds issued, the type 
of bonds, and its early access to railways, a reasonable robustness check is to 
exclude it. Table XI shows the results that use the same specification excluding 
Tokyo from our sample. As these estimates indicate, removing Tokyo does not 
qualitatively change the results reported earlier, although the magnitudes are 
smaller. As before, there is no average growth effect when pooled across all 
three sectors, but the same redistribution between sectors appears with areas 
that have higher bond value per capita and earlier rail access declining in the 
primary sector and growing in the tertiary. The main difference is that the 
redistribution occurs later and becomes more pronounced for the primary sector 
(i.e., significant and increasingly negative coefficients on the interaction term 
in the last two periods) with the opposite is true for the tertiary sector.  
The average total effect from the credit supply shock for these two 
sectors show consistent shrinkage over time, suggesting disproportionate 
tertiary sector losses in prefectures with both low bond values and later (or no) 
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rail access. Since the results including Tokyo show no shrinkage in the tertiary 
sector over the same periods, it may be that much of this sector's growth was 
localized to Tokyo in the interwar period while the pre-WWI period had more 
generalized growth in other prefectures. 
[Table XII] 
For additional robustness, we test whether excluding not only Tokyo, 
but also Osaka and the prefectures surrounding these two major metropolitan 
areas change our observed effects.35 Compared to just excluding Tokyo, this 
does not appear to be the case. While the number of prefectures in the sample 
drops from 37 (Table XI) to 30 (Table XII), there is no observed shrinkage in 
the tertiary sector for the full period up to 1940. For the first three periods up to 
1925, the tertiary sector shows generalized growth in the average total effect of 
the credit supply shock and the opposite for the primary sector. These results 
are consistent with those for the total sample of prefectures in Table VI and 
corroborate our interpretation that the credit supply shock had a nationwide 
effect on sector redistribution. 
Rail stations per capita are also not systematically associated with total 
economic growth (top panel) and may have exacerbated agglomeration of 
economic activity to the excluded prefectures. This is suggested by the negative 
coefficient on both the rail stations per capita variable and the interaction term 
with bond value up to 1925. The interaction term also lacks significance for 
both the primary and tertiary sectors, which may not be surprising since the 
excluded prefectures are those that gained rail access earliest due to promixity 
to Tokyo and Osaka. 
Two additional points should be clarified regarding the interpretation of 
our results. The first is that the results may overstate the role of the credit supply 
shock, when in fact pre-existing differences between prefectures may be 
responsible for post-bond issue growth trends or the allocation of the bonds 
themselves. While data limitations prevent us from performing a pre-trend 
 
35 In addition to the nine prefectures without bond value data, we exclude the prefectures of Tokyo, Chiba, Saitama, 
Kanagawa, Yamanashi, Osaka, Kyoto, Hyogo, Nara, and Wakayama. 
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analysis of prefectural activity since there is only one year of data (1874) before 
the stipend conversion, our pre-level analysis indicates that there were no 
statistically significant differences in prefectural per capita output given future 
per capita bond values and early rail access, even after including observables in 
1874 like population and urbanization. This is supported by a lack of statistical 
significance in the pairwise correlation of 1874 per capita output and 1876 per 
capita bond values, which suggests the prefectural differences observed in 
subsequent periods post-date the 1874 output data. 
Similarly, whether one can attribute the sectoral growth effects to the 
credit supply shock as opposed to the introduction of the railways is not 
immediately obvious given the coefficients for the latter are typically large in 
magnitude and statistically significant. It is true that the individual contribution 
of per capita bond value is not statistically significant (or opposing in sign) in 
many specifications, but the interaction with per capita rail stations corresponds 
in sign and significance with rail access on its own. Moreover, the magnitude 
of the interaction term's coefficient increases relative to that for rail access, and 
in the tertiary sector remains significant when railways are no longer. As 
discussed earlier, since the introduction of railways occurred nearly 
simultaneously as the credit supply shock, and the first two benchmark years 
(1874, 1890) effectively span both policy changes, our emphasis has been on 
the joint significance of both the bond issue and early market access. 
C. Structural Transformation  
Several studies have emphasized the barriers to structural 
transformation as the reason why the Japanese economy started its 
industrialization process later than other economies (e.g., Fukao and Paul 2017). 
Some specific limits to this structural transformation include legal constraints 
that limited urban emigration (Hayashi and Prescott 2008) or geographical 
constraints that determined the location of economic activity (Davis and 
Weinstein 2001). 
In this section we analyze whether the shock to credit supply and market 
access contributed to the structural transformation of the pre-war Japanese 
economy. There exist large literatures emphasizing the separate roles of 
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financial frictions and transport infrastructure on the allocation of factors (e.g., 
Banerjee and Duflo 2014; Atack et al 2008; Atack et al 2010), specifically labor. 
Thus, we would expect that the credit supply shock conditional on rail access 
facilitated the reallocation of labor from the primary to the secondary and 
tertiary sectors. 
[Table XIII] 
Table XIII reports the coefficients of running equation (2). It is the same 
model specification as the one used earlier for output growth but with the 
dependent variable measured as the change in the labor ratio between two 
sectors. The three panels show the results from the three combinations of 
primary, secondary, and tertiary sectors, and we interpret a positive sign on a 
coefficient as evidence that this variable contributed to structural 
transformation. For example, in the top panel comparing secondary to primary 
sector labor, the coefficient on the interaction term is positive and statistically 
significant. This implies that prefectures with higher bond value per capita and 
early rail access had greater reallocation of workers from the primary to the 
secondary sector. Although the interaction is positive in all subperiods, it is only 
statistically significant between 1874 and 1890. This result is a slight departure 
from that using output growth since the secondary sector experienced little 
change from the credit shock and railway access. It may be explained, however, 
given that manufacturing and exports thereof did not reach 10 percent of total 
national output or exports until the 1890s (Perkins and Tang 2017; Meissner 
and Tang 2018), but labor mobility significantly increased within and between 
regions (Tang 2018). 
In the middle panel, the dependent variable is the change in the ratio 
between labor in the tertiary and primary sectors. The coefficient on the 
interaction term is positive and usually statistically significant. This positive 
coefficient indicates that the shock in credit supply and presence of rail stations 
were associated with a decline in the primary sector labor force relative to that 
in the tertiary sector, and this effect is fairly persistent over time even as it 
decreases in magnitude. The statistical significance of the reallocation between 
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these sectors compared with the secondary sector is consistent with our findings 
on output growth.  
Finally, in the bottom panel the dependent variable is the change in the 
ratio between labor in the tertiary and secondary sector. This variable does not 
have a direct implication for structural transformation but we include it for 
completeness. The coefficient on the interaction term is positive but not 
statistically significant in any of the subsamples. This result implies that the 
shock to credit supply given rail access did not have a significant effect on the 
reallocation of labor between the secondary and tertiary sector. 
To summarize, the results presented in this section indicate that the 
shock to credit supply is associated with the structural transformation of the 
Japanese economy. Similar to the results on output growth, the effect of credit 
supply is somewhat dependent on early access to railways, which was in part 
driven by geographical constraints. That the effect persists for so long despite 
the integration of labor, goods, and capital markets over these decades suggest 
that initial conditions at the outset of industrialization are important to growth, 
and that our results are consistent with existing scholarship highlighting the 
roles of location and path dependence (Davis and Weinstein 2001). 
 
V. Concluding Remarks 
Studies on the impact of credit supply on economic growth usually 
emphasize the negative relationship with financial crises, neglecting to 
highlight potential short and long run benefits and heterogeneity between 
regions within a country. Moreover, the separate but equally relevant role of 
market access that may provide demand for available credit has largely been 
understated or ignored. Our analysis of a singular credit supply shock in late 
nineteenth century Japan indicates that there are persistent redistributive effects 
both between prefectures and between sectors. We find evidence that bond 
value per capita amplified the effects of early access to railways and generated 
faster output growth in the tertiary sector and slower growth in the primary 
sector. These effects were larger in the initial period (1874-1890) and attenuated 
over time up to 1940. We find analogous results for the reallocation of labor, 
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with the interaction of bond value per capita and rail access conducive to the 
structural transformation of the economy, leading to a reallocation of labor from 
the primary to the tertiary sector. An important contribution of our work is to 
emphasize the complementarity between shocks to credit supply and the initial 
characteristics of the country, including latent demand and market access, and 
underscore their persistence despite ongoing market integration and maturation. 
At the same time, while our results show that the creation of the bonds 
in rail accessible prefectures led to tertiary sector growth and primary sector 
shrinkage, within the tertiary sector this may be concentrated in banking itself. 
Tables VII and VIII suggest this interpretation since the use of banking capital 
as alternatives to the bonds, which preceded modern banking, indicate no 
tertiary sector growth. Thus, the credit supply shock's impact on output may 
have been truly neutral on most parts of the economy since neither the 
secondary nor tertiary sector (minus banking) were affected, and possibly 
negative depending on whether it is widely disbursed (Table VII) or used for 
political purposes (Table X).36 
Our results are also suggestive on the issues of how credit is channeled, 
which sectors benefit and when, and whether wealth concentration plays a role 
in development. While we have treated the samurai bonds as transferable 
instruments and are agnostic as to who holds them, their disposal or investment 
into financial institutions or direct investment was heterogenous, which we 
showed with some robustness checks. Samurai bond wealth via banking 
appeared to play a stronger role in manufacturing during the first age of 
globalization, when Japan was undergoing its industrialization, although this 
may be offset by the politicized nature of some banks and market access via 
railways. Sectoral output growth may lag labor reallocation, particularly in 
manufacturing, as wages may not rise as quickly as migration opportunities 
from rural areas to cities. Holders of the bonds may also matter as differences 
in their behavior may affect how the credit is used, with the wealthiest choosing 
to retain ownership despite lower interest payments and thus not taking 
advantage of profitable, but riskier, ventures with larger growth prospects. 
 
36 We would like to thank one of our referees for providing this insight. 
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These are all clearly areas for further work, especially with an interest in the 
persistence of income inequality and differences in bank versus equity finance 
(e.g., Moriguchi and Saez 2008, Miwa and Ramseyer 2002). 
Other extensions to our analysis would be to use more frequent data by 
year and/or a finer unit of analysis like firms. In particular, having shorter 
intervals during our period of analysis may allow us to be more precise in 
separating the credit supply and demand effects, i.e., the bond issuance and the 
expansion of the railroad network. Similarly, an examination of Japanese firms 
during periods of credit abundance and scarcity during the late 1870s and early 
1880s, respectively, may show more directly how capital constraints affected 
the concentration or competitiveness of the industries in which firms belonged. 
One could also examine whether credit availability and rail access influenced 
these firms' ability to expand domestically or become internationally 
competitive and if local government policies played a role, which is missing 
from our current analysis. Finally, understanding the importance of 
international trade on rationalizing firm behavior and providing capital outside 
of government bonds and banking capital would be a valuable complement to 
our study.  
Does the pre-war Japanese case generalize to other economic scenarios 
as well? Understandably, in the late nineteenth century the Japanese economy 
was fragmented and financially underdeveloped, which may account for the 
large observed effects. That said, the unanticipated credit supply shock was also 
extremely large in relative terms, and thus it may be unrealistic to expect similar 
magnitudes in a modern context. There is also unobserved heterogeneity in local 
politics or commercial ties that are not simply captured by one cross sectional 
difference in public credit supply. Nevertheless, the persistence of the impact 
from the bond issuance and early rail access for the entire pre-World War II 
period is remarkable given the rapidity of industrialization and market 
integration, and demonstrates that early monetary policy and infrastructure 
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TABLE I—SAMURAI STIPEND COMMUTATION SCALES, 1876 
Original Annual Income Value (yen) a Conversion Factorb  Bond Interest (%)c 
70,000 yen or higher 5.0 5  
60,000 to 70,000 5.25 5 
50,000 to 60,000 5.5 5 
40,000 to 50,000 5.75 5 
30,000 to 40,000 6.0 5 
20,000 to 30,000 6.25 5 
10,000 to 20,000 6.5 5 
7,000 to 10,000 6.75 5 
5,000 to 7,000 7.0 5 
2,000 to 5,000 7.25 5 
1,000 to 2,000 7.5 5 
900 to 1,000 7.75 6 
800 to 900 8.0 6 
700 to 800 8.25 6 
600 to 700 8.5 6 
500 to 600 8.75 6 
450 to 500 9.0 6 
400 to 450 9.25 6 
350 to 400 9.5 6 
300 to 350 9.75 6 
250 to 300 10.0 6 
200 to 250 10.25 6 
150 to 200 10.5 6 
100 to 150 11.0 6 
75 to 100 11.5 7 
50 to 75 12.0 7 
40 to 50 12.5 7 
30 to 40 13.0 7 
25 to 30 13.5 7 
Below 25 14.0 7 
 
Source: McLaren (1979) and Tomita (2005). aFor incomes in perpetuity. Non-hereditary life incomes 
receive the same interest rates but for half the duration. Non-hereditary fixed term incomes also receive 
the same interest rates but for shorter durations than hereditary incomes: above 10 years (40 percent); 
8 to 10 years (35 percent); 6 to 8 years (30 percent); 4 to 6 years (25 percent); 3 to 4 years (20 percent); 
and 2 years (15 percent). bScaling factor to convert annual income into total bond capitalization value; 
e.g., a 6,000 yen annual income would be converted into bonds worth 42,000 yen paying 5 percent 
interest per year. cRedemption of bonds bearing 7 percent interest was completed in 1891, 6 percent 
interest in 1893, and 5 percent interest in 1906. See text for more detail.  
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TABLE II—SAMURAI BOND DISTRIBUTION BY PREFECTURE 
 5 percent 6 percent 7 percent Totalb Per capitac 
      
Japana 31,412,405 25,003,741 108,242,785 173,844,631 5.68 
      
Tokyo 30,261,480 2,157,555 7,208,285 39,846,950 40.42 
Kagoshima 84,895 242,355 4,351,275 13,146,225 15.62 
Ishikawa 206,780 3,524,630 8,813,805 12,545,215 17.64 
Kochi 292,585 2,578,055 5,763,650 9,110,350 16.63 
Fukuoka 34,850 1,945,165 676,140 8,741,465 8.14 
Nagasaki 247,160 1,905,985 5,863,435 8,016,580 11.57 
Yamaguchi 13,835 1,058,930 5,432,035 6,518,215 7.52 
Aichi 27,815 935,810 4,982,120 5,945,745 4.71 
Kumamoto 14,295 2,310,420 3,560,705 5,885,420 5.93 
Shimane 42,930 1,208,645 3,841,395 5,092,970 8.14 
Ehime 15,570 683,025 4,108,920 4,807,515 5.90 
Shizuoka 0 1,225 3,838,490 3,839,715 4.43 
Hyogo 9,290 516,130 3,212,560 3,737,980 2.74 
Yamagata 0 279,410 3,072,000 3,351,640 5.00 
Oita 0 373,720 2,604,435 2,978,155 4.11 
Okayama 0 216,920 2,758,210 2,975,130 3.25 
Wakayama 23,325 740,515 2,070,915 2,834,755 4.84 
Akita  0 216,910 2,515,130 2,732,040 4.42 
Shiga 8,665 366,220 2,149,105 2,531,845 4.22 
Gunma 0 646,795 1,779,590 2,426,385 4.05 
Niigata 0 101,080 2,300,335 2,401,415 1.57 
Kyoto 0 464,115 1,934,690 2,398,805 2.62 
Nagano 0 268,740 2,116,420 2,385,160 2.40 
Hiroshima 26,470 327,050 1,820,130 2,173,650 1.73 
Ibaraki 0 113,151 2,025,530 2,138,681 3.01 
Gifu 19,480 402,755 1,650,485 2,072,720 2.69 
Mie 9,060 424,075 1,403,505 1,836,640 2.27 
Chiba 0 279,310 1,465,980 1,745,290 1.39 
Aomori 0 68,840 1,602,315 1,671,155 3.41 
Saitama 0 356,200 965,590 1,321,790 1.91 
Miyagi 0 5,470 1,273,330 1,278,800 2.58 
Fukushima 0 20,740 1,171,980 1,192,720 1.75 
Osaka 0 124,375 1,061,860 1,187,045 1.16 
Kanagawa 0 44,645 967,670 1,012,315 1.44 
Iwate 0 30,975 914,820 945,795 1.30 
Tochigi 0 44,290 652,745 697,035 1.06 
Hokkaido 43,345 730 185,595 236,300 1.56 
Yamanashi 0 12,150 42,295 54,445 0.14 
Source: Ministry of Finance (1904) and authors' calculations. aIncludes 5 percent bonds valued at 30,575 yen 
distributed to the imperial household, which are not prefecture specific. Fukui, Kagawa, Miyazaki, Nara, Saga, 
Tokushima, Tottori, and Toyama prefectures did not exist (i.e., were part of other prefectures) at the time of the 
stipend commutation, and Okinawa was not formally incorporated into Japan until 1879, after the commutation. 





TABLE III—DISTRIBUTION OF BANKING CAPITAL BY PREFECTURE, 1884 










Japan 142 52,536,000 58.5 32,667,000 85,203,000 
      
Tokyo 16 28,046,000 73.2 3,983,000 32,029,000 
Kanagawa 4 3,100,000 27.0 2,124,000 5,224,000 
Niigata 5 1,300,000 15.8 3,238,000 4,538,000 
Shizuoka 3 750,000 17.7 3,661,000 4,411,000 
Osaka 11 2,590,000 12.7 1,642,000 4,232,000 
Nagano 4 760,000 34.9 2,786,000 3,546,000 
Yamanashi 1 250,000 5.8 2,067,000 2,317,000 
Saitama 1 200,000 25.8 1,459,000 1,659,000 
Fukushima 5 930,000 20.4 676,000 1,606,000 
Aichi 4 
 
670,000 40.0 913,000 1,583,000 
Gunma 2 570,000 47.4 823,000 1,393,000 
Gifu 5 760,000 30.6 580,000 1,340,000 
Hyogo 7 790,000 37.1 460,000 1,250,000 
Saga 2 390,000 94.1 795,000 1,185,000 
Fukuoka 4 640,000 72.2 504,000 1,144,000 
Okayama 2 380,000 81.5 689,000 1,069,000 
Toyama 1 300,000 21.1 744,000 1,044,000 
Ehime 4 440,000 53.3 536,000 976,000 
Oita 3 340,000 73.1 584,000 924,000 
Tokushima 1 260,000 76.3 636,000 896,000 
Ibaraki 4 420,000 76.4 416,000 836,000 
Nagasaki 3 370,000 35.7 435,000 805,000 
Yamagata 4 590,000 37.5 174,000 764,000 
Kyoto 4 400,000 38.4 330,000 730,000 
Fukui 4 430,000 91.2 282,000 712,000 
Shiga 3 500,000 17.7 210,000 710,000 
Yamaguchi 2 680,000 89.9 0 680,000 
Kochi 4 650,000 64.0 0 650,000 
Tochigi 1 300,000 27.3 314,000 614,000 
Miyazaki 2 100,000 80.8 511,000 611,000 
Kagoshima 2 530,000 90.8 67,000 597,000 
Chiba 2 215,000 73.7 275,000 490,000 
Aomori 2 300,000 78.4 181,000 481,000 
Hiroshima 2 440,000 50.5 0 440,000 
Hokkaido 2 330,000 40.7 100,000 430,000 
Kumamoto 3 265,000 96.9 100,000 365,000 
Mie 4 350,000 65.8 0 350,000 
Wakayama 1 200,000 74.1 117,000 317,000 
Miyagi 1 250,000 42.4 32,000 282,000 
Tottori 1 200,000 86.9 24,000 224,000 
Ishikawa 2 190,000 63.9 0 190,000 
Iwate 2 150,000 64.9 20,000 170,000 
Shimane 1 80,000 70.6 79,000 159,000 
Akita  1 100,000 31.6 0 100,000 
Okinawa 0 0 0 100,000 100,000 
Source: Japan Statistical Association (1962) and authors' calculations. aExcludes branches. bIn nominal yen. Other 




TABLE IV—PRE-WAR PREFECTURAL OUTPUT AND LABOR, 1874-1940 
      
        
        
      
      
      
      
      
 
1874 1890 1909 1925 1940 
All Prefectures     
Gross Prefectural Product 83,976 113,156 175,413 311,803 519,881 
  Per capita output 113.2 127.8 152.7 214.5 285.5 
  Primary (%) 48.5 42.4 40.6 30.8 21.3 
  Secondary (%) 7.1 11.0 15.0 19.4 32.3 
  Tertiary (%) 44.3 46.5 44.4 49.8 46.4 
Labor force (thou) 470.4 500.0 499.6 586.4 717.8 
  Primary (%) 70.1 60.0 57.8 50.9 47.6 
  Secondary (%) 12.7 20.8 20.6 23.0 25.0 
  Tertiary (%) 17.1 19.2 21.6 26.1 27.4 
      
Bond Prefecturesa     
Gross Prefectural Product 91,211 125,076 198,592 357.5 601,687 
  Per capita output 113.9 131.0 157.8 221.5 292.394 
  Primary (%) 49.1 42.1 39.3 29.8 20.8 
  Secondary (%) 7.3 11.3 15.3 19.6 32.9 
  Tertiary (%) 43.6 46.6 45.4 50.6 46.3 
Labor force (thou) 569.4 605.2 604.8 709.9 868.9 
  Primary (%) 70.9 60.3 57.4 50.3 46.9 
  Secondary (%) 12.7 20.8 20.8 23.3 25.5 
  Tertiary (%) 16.4 18.9 21.8 26.5 27.6 
      
Source: Fukao et al (2015) and authors' calculations. Gross prefectural product and per capita output in thousand 
constant 1934-36 yen; see Fukao et al (2015). aExcludes prefectures that did not exist at the time of bond payments; see 




TABLE V—BOND VALUE OUTPUT GROWTH REGRESSIONS, 1874-1890 
DV: ∆Ln(Output per capita)  A B C D 
All sectors     












   Interaction of bond value and rail 
access 












   R-squared 0.144 0.052 0.168 0.457 
   F-statistic 1.64 1.14 1.67 4.11*** 
Primary sector     












   Interaction of bond value and rail 
access 












   R-squared 0.191 0.289 0.556 0.763 
   F-statistic 7.14*** 22.49*** 6.89*** 13.39*** 
Secondary sector     












   Interaction of bond value and rail 
access 












   R-squared 0.062 0.217 0.221 0.339 
   F-statistic 0.88 4.43** 1.89 3.13*** 
Tertiary sector     












   Interaction of bond value and rail 
access 












   R-squared 0.329 0.116 0.463 0.520 
   F-statistic 7.25*** 3.15* 10.58*** 8.84*** 
     
Observations 38 38 38 38 
 
Significance: ***1 percent, **5 percent, *10 percent. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All specifications include 
year dummies and a lagged output growth variable and exclude the nine prefectures with missing bond data; see Table 
II. Column D includes time-varying control variables of population, per capita student enrollment share, and low 
gradient land population density; see text for details. Bond values and gross prefectural product per capita in 1934-36 
constant yen. Average total effect is the predicted effect for the prefecture with the average value of bonds per capita 
(column A); the average number of railway stations per capita (column B) and both of them (columns C and D). The 
average of ln(1876 bond value per capita) is -0.292, the average number of railway stations per capita (in thousands) is 




TABLE VI—BOND VALUE OUTPUT GROWTH REGRESSIONS, ALL PERIODS 
DV: ∆Ln(Output per 
capita)  
1874-1890 1874-1909 1874-1925 1874-1935 1874-1940 
All sectors      
























   Interaction of bond value 





















   R-squared 0.457 0.372 0.470 0.469 0.456 
   F-statistic 4.11*** 8.38*** 15.27*** 19.84*** 21.90*** 
Primary sector      
























   Interaction of bond value 





















   R-squared 0.763 0.577 0.456 0.459 0.380 
   F-statistic 13.39*** 15.09*** 14.94*** 42.10*** 22.22*** 
Secondary sector      
























   Interaction of bond value 





















   R-squared 0.339 0.213 0.114 0.089 0.208 
   F-statistic 3.13*** 3.27*** 2.43** 1.40 9.80*** 
Tertiary sector      
























   Interaction of bond value 





















   R-squared 0.520 0.408 0.547 0.680 0.668 
   F-statistic 8.84*** 10.99*** 28.16*** 80.47*** 78.88*** 
      
Observations 38 76 114 152 190 
 
Significance: ***1 percent, **5 percent, *10 percent. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All specifications include 
time-varying control variables of population, per capita student enrollment share, and low gradient land population 
density, year dummies, and a lagged output growth variable, and exclude the nine prefectures with missing bond data; 
see text for details and Table II. Bond values and gross prefectural product per capita in 1934-36 constant yen. Average 
total effect is the predicted effect for the prefecture with the average value of bonds per capita and the average number 
of railway stations per capita. The average of ln(1876 bond value per capita) is -0.292, the average number of railway 




TABLE VII—BANKING CAPITAL REGRESSIONS, ALL PERIODS 
DV: ∆Ln(Output per 
capita)  
1874-1890 1874-1909 1874-1925 1874-1935 1874-1940 
All sectors      
























   Interaction of banking 





















   R-squared 0.366 0.339 0.457 0.463 0.452 
   F-statistic 3.37*** 6.62*** 11.96*** 22.41*** 21.89*** 
Primary sector      
























   Interaction of banking 





















   R-squared 0.807 0.643 0.487 0.469 0.384 
   F-statistic 28.97*** 20.24*** 31.05*** 31.02*** 20.45*** 
Secondary sector      
























   Interaction of banking 





















   R-squared 0.339 0.218 0.128 0.097 0.216 
   F-statistic 7.14*** 7.00*** 4.29*** 2.40** 10.60*** 
Tertiary sector      
























   Interaction of banking 





















   R-squared 0.346 0.334 0.513 0.668 0.660 
   F-statistic 3.08** 6.72*** 12.23** 46.42*** 41.49*** 
      
Observations 38 76 114 152 190 
 
Significance: ***1 percent, **5 percent, *10 percent. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All specifications include 
time-varying control variables of population, per capita student enrollment share, and low gradient land population 
density, year dummies, and a lagged output growth variable, and exclude the nine prefectures with missing bond data; 
see text for details and Table II. Bank capital and gross prefectural product per capita in 1934-36 constant yen. Average 
total effect is the predicted effect for the prefecture with the average value of banking capita per capita and the average 
number of railway stations per capita. The average of ln(1884 banking capital per capita) is 0.211, the average number 




TABLE VIII—SAMURAI BANK CAPITAL REGRESSIONS, ALL PERIODS 
DV: ∆Ln(Output per 
capita)  
1874-1890 1874-1909 1874-1925 1874-1935 1874-1940 
All sectors      
   Ln(1884 samurai bank 























   Interaction of banking 





















   R-squared 0.383 0.330 0.456 0.463 0.451 
   F-statistic 4.01*** 8.01*** 9.60*** 18.15*** 19.17*** 
Primary sector      
   Ln(1884 samurai bank 























   Interaction of banking 





















   R-squared 0.720 0.560 0.418 0.416 0.356 
   F-statistic 14.11*** 25.51*** 17.15*** 35.71*** 27.77*** 
Secondary sector      
   Ln(1884 samurai bank 























   Interaction of banking 





















   R-squared 0.441 0.258 0.129 0.095 0.212 
   F-statistic 10.44*** 8.31*** 10.69*** 4.04*** 12.59*** 
Tertiary sector      
   Ln(1884 samurai bank 























   Interaction of banking 





















   R-squared 0.282 0.304 0.505 0.667 0.660 
   F-statistic 3.43*** 9.74*** 10.99*** 44.87*** 37.73*** 
      
Observations 38 76 114 152 190 
 
Significance: ***1 percent, **5 percent, *10 percent. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All specifications include 
time-varying control variables of population, per capita student enrollment share, and low gradient land population 
density, year dummies, and a lagged output growth variable, and exclude the nine prefectures with missing bond data; 
see text for details and Table II. Samurai-owned national bank capital and gross prefectural product per capita in 1934-
36 constant yen. Average total effect is the predicted effect for the prefecture with the average value of samurai bank 
capital per capita and the average number of railway stations per capita. The average of ln(1884 samurai bank capital 




TABLE IX—HIGH COUPON BOND VALUE REGRESSIONS, ALL PERIODS 
DV: ∆Ln(Output per 
capita)  
1874-1890 1874-1909 1874-1925 1874-1935 1874-1940 
All sectors      
   Ln(1876 high coupon 























   Interaction of bond value 





















   R-squared 0.486 0.377 0.469 0.469 0.456 
   F-statistic 4.47*** 8.28*** 18.07*** 23.94*** 24.19*** 
Primary sector      
   Ln(1876 high coupon 























   Interaction of bond value 





















   R-squared 0.703 0.537 0.442 0.456 0.382 
   F-statistic 10.15*** 13.53*** 15.20*** 30.29*** 21.52*** 
Secondary sector      
   Ln(1876 high coupon 























   Interaction of bond value 





















   R-squared 0.375 0.221 0.114 0.089 0.208 
   F-statistic 5.37*** 4.01*** 1.97* 1.33 10.93*** 
Tertiary sector      
   Ln(1876 high coupon 























   Interaction of bond value 





















   R-squared 0.526 0.416 0.548 0.681 0.668 
   F-statistic 10.35*** 12.33*** 51.23*** 82.09*** 79.20*** 
      
Observations 38 76 114 152 190 
 
Significance: ***1 percent, **5 percent, *10 percent. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All specifications include 
time-varying control variables of population, per capita student enrollment share, and low gradient land population 
density, year dummies, and a lagged output growth variable, and exclude the nine prefectures with missing bond data; 
see text for details and Table II. High coupon bond values (six percent or more) and gross prefectural product per capita 
in 1934-36 constant yen; see Table I. Average total effect is the predicted effect for the prefecture with the average 
value of high coupon bonds per capita and the average number of railway stations per capita. The average of ln(1876 




TABLE X—LOW COUPON BOND VALUE REGRESSIONS, ALL PERIODS 
DV: ∆Ln(Output per 
capita)  
1874-1890 1874-1909 1874-1925 1874-1935 1874-1940 
All sectors      
   Ln(1876 low coupon 























   Interaction of bond value 





















   R-squared 0.453 0.351 0.452 0.466 0.455 
   F-statistic 4.54*** 11.66** 17.21*** 17.22*** 22.96*** 
Primary sector      
   Ln(1876 low coupon 























   Interaction of bond value 





















   R-squared 0.673 0.529 0.431 0.443 0.373 
   F-statistic 13.72*** 21.28*** 19.59*** 35.69*** 24.91*** 
Secondary sector      
   Ln(1876 low coupon 























   Interaction of bond value 





















   R-squared 0.428 0.222 0.119 0.105 0.216 
   F-statistic 7.56*** 6.44*** 2.44** 2.76** 11.36*** 
Tertiary sector      
   Ln(1876 low coupon 























   Interaction of bond value 





















   R-squared 0.318 0.345 0.509 0.667 0.661 
   F-statistic 3.69*** 9.23*** 16.07*** 44.67*** 41.80*** 
      
Observations 38 76 114 152 190 
 
Significance: ***1 percent, **5 percent, *10 percent. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All specifications include 
time-varying control variables of population, per capita student enrollment share, and low gradient land population 
density, year dummies, and a lagged output growth variable, and exclude the nine prefectures with missing bond data; 
see text for details and Table II. Low coupon bond values (five percent) and gross prefectural product per capita in 
1934-36 constant yen; see Table I. Average total effect is the predicted effect for the prefecture with the average value 
of high coupon bonds per capita and the average number of railways station per capita. The average of ln(1876 low 




TABLE XI—BOND VALUE OUTPUT GROWTH REGRESSIONS EXCLUDING TOKYO, ALL PERIODS 
DV: ∆Ln(Output per 
capita)  
1874-1890 1874-1909 1874-1925 1874-1935 1874-1940 
All sectors      

























   Interaction of bond value 





















   R-squared 0.52 0.39 0.49 0.49 0.47 
   F-statistic 8.88*** 7.84**** 14.59*** 23.36*** 23.18*** 
Primary sector      
























   Interaction of bond value 





















   R-squared 0.78 0.61 0.45 0.48 0.42 
   F-statistic 42.24*** 35.57*** 10.78*** 18.29*** 16.31*** 
Secondary sector      
























   Interaction of bond value 





















   R-squared 0.45 0.23 0.13 0.09 0.21 
   F-statistic 10.71*** 5.41*** 2.53** 1.49 13.48*** 
Tertiary sector      
























   Interaction of bond value 





















   R-squared 0.52 0.42 0.55 0.69 0.67 
   F-statistic 10.11*** 11.63*** 38.31*** 84.91*** 94.40*** 
      
Observations 37 74 111 148 185 
 
Significance: ***1 percent, **5 percent, *10 percent. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All specifications include 
time-varying control variables of population, per capita student enrollment share, and low gradient land population 
density, year dummies, and a lagged output growth variable, and exclude the nine prefectures with missing bond data; 
see text for details and Table II. Bond values and gross prefectural product per capita in 1934-36 constant yen. Average 
total effect is the predicted effect for the prefecture with the average value of bonds per capita and the average number 
of railway stations per capita excluding Tokyo. The average of ln(1876 bond value per capita) is -0.36, the average 
number of railway stations per capita (in thousands) is 0.0023.  
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TABLE XII—BOND VALUE OUTPUT GROWTH REGRESSIONS EXCLUDING MAJOR METRO AREAS, ALL PERIODS 
DV: ∆Ln(Output per 
capita)  
1874-1890 1874-1909 1874-1925 1874-1935 1874-1940 
All sectors      

























   Interaction of bond value 





















   R-squared 0.71 0.59 0.66 0.56 0.55 
   F-statistic 11.36*** 24.84**** 14.59*** 51.00*** 47.92*** 
Primary sector      
























   Interaction of bond value 





















   R-squared 0.82 0.75 0.61 0.61 0.53 
   F-statistic 35.57*** 24.53*** 33.23*** 46.88*** 39.33*** 
Secondary sector      
























   Interaction of bond value 





















   R-squared 0.58 0.30 0.20 0.11 0.22 
   F-statistic 72.70*** 11.88*** 3.46*** 1.57 28.31*** 
Tertiary sector      
























   Interaction of bond value 





















   R-squared 0.62 0.58 0.69 0.77 0.76 
   F-statistic 11.32*** 24.42*** 84.71*** 154.14*** 201.53*** 
      
Observations 30 60 90 120 150 
 
Significance: ***1 percent, **5 percent, *10 percent. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All specifications include 
time-varying control variables of population, per capita student enrollment share, and low gradient land population 
density, year dummies, and a lagged output growth variable, and exclude the nine prefectures with missing bond data 
as well as Tokyo, Osaka, and prefectures sharing land borders with them; see text for details and Table II. Bond values 
and gross prefectural product per capita in 1934-36 constant yen. Average total effect is the predicted effect for the 
prefecture with the average value of bonds per capita and the average number of railway stations per capita excluding 
Tokyo. The average of ln(1876 bond value per capita) is -0.13, the average number of railway stations per capita (in 
thousands) is 0.0020.  
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TABLE XIII—LABOR SHARE GROWTH REGRESSIONS BY BOND VALUE, ALL PERIODS 
 1874-1890 1874-1909 1874-1925 1874-1935 1874-1940 
DV: ∆secondary/primary 
labor force 
     
























   Interaction of bond value 





















   R-squared 0.611 0.738 0.706 0.726 0.716 
   F-statistic 15.03*** 38.97*** 46.93*** 45.95*** 43.47*** 
DV: ∆tertiary/primary 
labor force 
     
























   Interaction of bond value 





















   R-squared 0.462 0.439 0.413 0.407 0.483 
   F-statistic 9.68*** 22.41*** 33.60*** 44.16*** 50.73*** 
DV: ∆tertiary/secondary 
labor force 
     
























   Interaction of bond value 





















   R-squared 0.612 0.779 0.743 0.725 0.676 
   F-statistic 8.56*** 41.76*** 121.70*** 128.04*** 113.42*** 
Observations 38 76 114 152 190 
 
Significance: ***1 percent, **5 percent, *10 percent. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All specifications include 
time-varying control variables of population, per capita student enrollment share, and low gradient land population 
density, year dummies, and a lagged labor share ratio variable, and exclude the nine prefectures with missing bond data; 
see text for details and Table II. Bond values in 1934-36 constant yen. Average total effect is the predicted effect for 
the prefecture with the average value of bonds per capita and the average number of railway stations per capita. The 



















Source: Ministry of Finance (1904) and authors' calculations. Bond values in nominal yen per capita. Railway trunk 










Source: Fukao et al (2015). Output per capita are in 1934-36 constant yen. 
 
 
 
